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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Richard Alan Wilson appeals the district court’s Judgment And Commitment
entered after a jury found him guilty on two counts of aiding and abetting trafficking in
methamphetamine. Wilson argues on appeal that the state did not present sufficient
evidence for his convictions.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On April 7, 2016, Regina Jones, an alleged drug dealer, contacted Mike Phillips, a
detective with the Nampa Police Department working undercover in the special
investigations unit, and told him “that she had just picked up two ounces of
Methamphetamine and wanted to know if [he] wanted to get them.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr.,
p.169, L.25 – p.170, L.11; p.178, L.4 – p.179, L.15.) She offered to sell one ounce of
methamphetamine for $650 or two ounces for $1200. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.179, Ls.418.) Detective Phillips agreed to buy both ounces for $1200. (Id.) Jones and Detective
Phillips agreed to meet at Target around 6 p.m. to make the exchange. (2/28/2017 Trial
Tr., p.179, L.19 – p.180, L.1.)
Detective Phillips went alone in his car to Target. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.23.) He wore a wire and had a team of officers surveilling the transaction. (2/28/2017 Trial
Tr., p.180, Ls.4-11.) He contacted Jones before arriving. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.180,
Ls.12-20.) “She told [him] that she was going to be in a white Ford Expedition and the
hood was going to be popped, and that’s how [he] could tell that she was there.” (Id.)
When Detective Phillips pulled up to the white Ford Expedition, he “saw a male
subject standing outside the front of the vehicle . . . kind of lingering around the front of

1

the vehicle looking around.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.2-8.) “The hood was popped.”
(Id.) Detective Phillips sent a text message to Jones informing her which car he was in.
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.9-15.)
Jones got out of the white Ford Expedition and into Detective Phillips’s car.
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.9-22.)

They had “kind of general conversation.”

(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.16-22.) Detective Phillips gave Jones the money, and she
handed him “a Ziploc baggie” that “contained two smaller baggies which contained
Methamphetamine.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.9-22; p.190, Ls.9-17.) After the
transaction, Jones went back to the white Ford Expedition. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.191,
Ls.11-13.) The unidentified male “shut the hood on the car and then went and got in the
passenger seat of the Ford Expedition.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.190, L.23 – p.191, L.3.)
Detective Phillips submitted the substance he obtained from Jones to the lab for
testing. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.5-24.) The lab results showed that the first baggie
weighed 27.76 grams, and the second baggie weighed 27.89 grams. (3/1/2017 Trial Tr.,
p.21, Ls.13-25.) The substances in both baggies tested positive for methamphetamine.
(3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.23, L.2 – p.24, L.8.)
On April 27, 2016, Detective Phillips set up another deal with Jones: “an ounce of
Methamphetamine for $600.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.15-23; p.212, Ls.8-10.)
Detective Phillips contacted Jones to “tell her specifically that [he] wanted an ounce” of
methamphetamine. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.11-20.) Jones told Detective Phillips
“that she didn’t have it with her, that she had to go pick it up from Robert’s house.”
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.21-23.) Jones told Detective Phillips that she would pick
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up the methamphetamine and then meet him at “McDonald’s off of Garrity in Nampa.”
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.3-17.)
This time Detective Phillips made it to the agreed location first. (2/28/2017 Trial
Tr., p.214, Ls.12-24.) He saw a four-door Nissan pull into the parking lot. (2/28/2017
Trial Tr., p.214, Ls.12-18.) The same unidentified male from the first transaction was
driving the car, and Jones was in the passenger seat. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.214, L.19 –
p.215, L.1.) “The male subject got out of the vehicle, out of the driver’s side, popped the
hood, raised the hood, just like he did before. Milled around the front. Looked around
while [Jones] was seated in the car for a couple minutes.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.215,
Ls.7-12.)
Detective Phillips sent Jones a text message with his location, and Jones eventually
came over and sat in his car. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.16-23.) She gave Detective
Phillips “a baggie of white crystal substance” and he gave her $620. 1 (2/28/2017 Trial Tr.,
p.215, L.24 – p.216, L.5.) Detective Phillips told Jones that he needed another ounce.
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.6-11.) In the recorded conversation, he referred to the
methamphetamine as “dope.” (Exhibit 9 at 01:00 – 1:08.) Jones agreed to provide an
additional ounce but “told [him] she would have to go back to Robert’s house and pick it
up and bring it back to [him].” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.6-13.)
Jones “walked back to the Nissan where the male subject, he had already, after he
had looked around a little bit, closed the lid and got back into the vehicle.” (2/28/2017
Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.20-23.) Jones and the unidentified male left in the Nissan. (2/28/2017

1

As Detective Phillips explained at the trial, the agreed-upon price for the ounce of
methamphetamine was $600, but he unintentionally included an extra $20 in the money he
gave to Jones. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.6-14.)
3

Trial Tr., p.217, Ls.3-6.) The unidentified male was driving. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.216,
Ls.24-25.)
One of the officers surveilling the undercover transaction sent out a radio request
stating he wanted the Nissan stopped. (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.92, L.17 – p.93, L.3; p.94,
L.16 – p.95, L.15.) Officer Jacob Peper of the Nampa Police Department received the
request and stopped the vehicle. (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.52, Ls.7-12; p.53, Ls.6-19.) The
previously unidentified male, who was driving the vehicle, identified himself as Richard
Alan Wilson. (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.54, Ls.8-17.) Jones was in the passenger seat.
(3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.54, L.25 – p.55, L.1.) Officer Peper conducted a search of Wilson
and, “in his front left pants pocket, [he] found $600 cash.” (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.55, Ls.912.) The serial numbers on the money seized from Wilson matched the serial numbers of
the money Detective Phillips used to purchase the methamphetamine from Jones.
(3/1/2017, Trial Tr., p.129, L.3 – p.130, L.4.)
Detective Phillips submitted to the lab the substance he received from Jones.
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.14-22.) The substance weighed 25.91 grams. (3/1/2017
Trial Tr., p.31, L.13 – p.32, L.17.) It also tested positive for methamphetamine. (3/1/2017
Trial Tr., p.32, L.23 – p.33, L.12.)
A few days after the April 27 transaction, Wilson contacted the police “wanting to
come and try and recover the money that had been seized.” (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.68, L.21
– p.69, L.11.) In a video-recorded interview with law enforcement, Wilson “stated that he
had received that money from work and through loans from family and such.” (3/1/2017
Trial Tr., p.70, L.24 – p.71, L.2; see State’s Exhibit 5 at 01:48 – 02:16.) And Wilson wrote
and signed a witness statement to that effect. (State’s Exhibit 6.)
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Wilson also stated that Jones had mentioned that law enforcement wanted her “to
flip.” (State’s Exhibit 5 at 07:50 – 08:14.) One of the officers asked Wilson, “are you in
the game, then?” (Id. at 08:34 – 08:36.) Wilson responded, “sort of.” (Id. at 08:37 –
08:39). When asked to elaborate, Wilson explained that he goes with Jones “when she
does deals.” (Id. at 08:44 – 08:48.) Wilson told the officers that Jones compensates him
with free lunch and free “dope.” (Id. at 09:00 – 09:10.) He also admitted that he uses
“dope.” (Id.) Wilson stated that the reason he goes with Jones is “protection, mainly.”
(Id. at 09:10 – 09:17.)
The State charged Wilson with two counts of aiding and abetting Jones in
trafficking methamphetamine, one count for the transaction on April 7, 2016, and one count
for the transaction on April 27, 2016. (R., pp.7-8.) A jury found Wilson guilty on both
counts. (R., pp.139-40.) The district court sentenced Wilson to ten years’ imprisonment
with three years fixed. (R., pp.155-56.) Wilson timely appealed. (R., pp.157-62.)

5

ISSUE
Wilson states the issue on appeal as:
Was there sufficient evidence to support Mr. Wilson’s convictions of two
counts of aiding and abetting trafficking in methamphetamine?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Wilson failed to show that the state did not present sufficient evidence for his
convictions?
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ARGUMENT
Wilson Has Failed To Show That The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence
For His Convictions
A.

Introduction
The jury’s convictions of Wilson on both counts of aiding and abetting the

trafficking of methamphetamine are supported by substantial evidence.

Wilson

unsuccessfully attacks three conclusions reached by the jury: (1) Jones represented the
methamphetamine sold on April 27 weighed one ounce; (2) Wilson intended to aid and
abet the sale of methamphetamine on April 27; and (3) Wilson knew that the substance
sold on April 7 and April 27 was methamphetamine.
The state proved that Jones represented the methamphetamine sold on April 27
weighed one ounce through the testimony of Detective Phillips, the individual to whom
Jones made the representation. He testified that, prior to the transaction, he asked Jones
specifically for one ounce of methamphetamine and she agreed to get “it” for him. That is
substantial evidence that Jones represented the methamphetamine weighed one ounce,
even under Wilson’s definition of representation as “a presentation of fact—either by
words or conduct—made to induce someone to act.” (Appellant’s brief, p.19.)
The state proved that Wilson intended to aid and abet the trafficking of
methamphetamine on April 27 by showing his extensive participation in the sale. Wilson
provided transportation to and from the transaction, sent the signal to the buyer that they
had arrived, provided protection for the transaction, and walked away with virtually all of
the money paid for the methamphetamine. Contrary to Wilson’s assertion, the state did
not need to prove that he knew that Jones represented the methamphetamine weighed an
ounce because the only relevance of the representation was to prove the determinative
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amount of methamphetamine under the statute, and the state does not need to prove
knowledge of the amount to secure a conviction for trafficking methamphetamine.
The state proved that Wilson knew the substance was methamphetamine through
circumstantial evidence. Specifically, the state presented evidence that Wilson knew Jones
distributed methamphetamine, intimately participated in the sale of the methamphetamine
on both occasions, received the going-rate for an ounce of methamphetamine after the
second transaction, and lied about the source of the drug money to the police. All of that
evidence belies Wilson’s claim that “[t]he jury was presented with no evidence that he
knew Ms. Jones sold methamphetamine.” (Appellant’s brief, p.21.)

B.

Standard Of Review
“This Court ‘will uphold a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict so

long as there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that
the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 572, 388 P.3d 583, 586 (2017) (quoting State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009)). “Evidence is substantial if a
‘reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed
point of fact has been proven.’” Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432 (quoting State
v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 135, 937 P.2d 960, 961 (Ct. App. 1997) (brackets omitted)).
This Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in
determining whether substantial evidence exists” and “will not substitute [its] own
judgment for that of the jury on matters such as the credibility of witnesses, the weight to
be given to certain evidence, and the ‘reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence.’” Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003)).
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C.

The State Presented Substantial Evidence Upon Which A Rational Trier Of Fact
Could Convict Wilson On Both Counts Of Aiding And Abetting The Trafficking
Of Methamphetamine
The state presented substantial evidence that Wilson aided and abetted the

trafficking of methamphetamine on April 7, 2016, and April 27, 2016. The district court
instructed the jury that, in order to convict Wilson on each count, the state must prove five
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) on the relevant date, (2) in the state of Idaho, (3)
“the defendant aided and abetted Regina L. Jones in the delivery of methamphetamine,”
(4) “the defendant knew it was methamphetamine,” and (5) “Either: (a) the quantity
delivered was at least twenty-eight (28) grams . . . Or (b) the quantity delivered was
represented to be one ounce or more of methamphetamine.” (Aug., pp.38-39 (underlining
in original).) Wilson did not take issue with that characterization of the elements of the
crime in the district court and has not done so on appeal. Instead, Wilson argues that the
state failed to present substantial evidence to show that (1) the methamphetamine in the
April 27, 2016 transaction weighed at least 28 grams; (2) Wilson had the requisite intent
with respect to the April 27, 2016 transaction; and (3) Wilson knew that the substance
Jones sold in either transaction was methamphetamine. He is wrong.
1. Substantial Evidence Showed The Methamphetamine Weighed At Least 28 Grams
The state presented substantial evidence at trial that the methamphetamine used in
the transaction on April 27, 2016, weighed at least 28 grams. A person can be convicted
of trafficking methamphetamine when the transaction involves “twenty-eight (28) grams
or more of methamphetamine.” I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4). Pursuant to the statute, “the weight
of the controlled substance as represented by the person selling or delivering it is
determinative if the weight as represented is greater than the actual weight of the controlled
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substance.” I.C. § 37-2732B(c). This means the state can prove the weight element of the
crime either by (1) showing the actual weight is at least 28 grams or (2) showing that the
“person selling or delivering” the methamphetamine “represented” that it weighed at least
28 grams. See id.
For the April 27 transaction, the state used the second approach by offering
substantial evidence that Jones “represented” that the methamphetamine sold on April 27
weighed more than 28 grams, I.C. § 37-2732B(c). Wilson does not dispute that Jones both
sold and delivered methamphetamine to Detective Phillips on April 27, which means, as
the “person selling or delivering” the methamphetamine, Jones’s representation of the
weight of the methamphetamine was “determinative.” Id. Detective Phillips testified that,
in discussing the terms of the transaction prior to the exchange, he “specifically” told Jones
that he “wanted an ounce” of methamphetamine. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212 Ls.18-20.)
He also testified as to what Jones said in response: “She told me that she didn’t have it with
her, that she had to go pick it up from Robert’s house.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.2123 (emphases added).)
A rational trier of fact would, or at the very least could, conclude from Detective
Phillips’s testimony that Jones was telling Detective Phillips that she had exactly what he
had requested (i.e., an ounce of methamphetamine) and she was willing to sell “it” to him
but she had to go pick “it” up first. This representation by Jones that the methamphetamine
she sold Detective Phillips on April 27 weighed an ounce satisfied the statute’s 28-gram
threshold. (See 3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.35, Ls.15-17 (lab scientist testifying that “[t]here are
28.35 grams in an ounce”); 3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.171, L.21 (district court instructing the
jury that “[o]ne ounce equals 28.35 grams”).)
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The jury also heard other evidence that supported the conclusion that Jones
“represented” to Detective Phillips that the methamphetamine weighed at least 28 grams.
Detective Phillips, the individual to whom Jones made the representation, understood from
the conversation that he “was supposed to be getting an ounce of Methamphetamine for
$600.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.3-10.) In addition, the “going rate” for an ounce of
methamphetamine at the time of the deal was $600—the exact amount for which Jones
agreed to sell the methamphetamine. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.177, Ls.7-9.)
The state does not disagree with Wilson that “representation” can be defined as “a
presentation of fact—either by words or by conduct—made to induce someone to act, esp.
to enter into a contract.” (Appellant’s brief, p.19 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, (10th
ed. 2014)).) But that definition describes perfectly Jones’s behavior and statements as
explained by Detective Phillips. Detective Phillips told Jones “specifically that [he] wanted
an ounce” of methamphetamine. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.18-20.) Rather than tell
Detective Phillips that she did not have an ounce or would be providing a different amount,
Jones responded that “[s]he didn’t have it with her, that she had to go pick it up from
Robert’s house.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.21-23 (emphases added).) Then she met
with Detective Phillips later that same day and gave him methamphetamine in exchange
for $600, the going rate for an ounce of methamphetamine. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.177,
Ls.4-9; p.212, Ls.24-25; p.215, L.24 – p.216, L.5.) Both Detective Phillips and the jury
reasonably concluded, based on Jones’s words and conduct, that Jones represented as fact
to Detective Phillips that she could get “an ounce of Methamphetamine” and sell it to him
“for $600.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.8-10.) Such a “represent[ation] by the person
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selling or delivering” the methamphetamine is all that the statute requires. I.C. § 372732B(c).
Wilson focuses on the recorded conversation that took place at the time of the
transaction, arguing that “there were no statements made during the transaction from
which the jury could infer that Ms. Jones was representing the methamphetamine to weigh
an ounce.” (Appellant’s brief, p.20 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).) But that is a red
herring. Jones made the representation via cell phone before the transaction and recorded
conversation took place. 2 (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.211, L.15 – p.212, L.23.) That is
sufficient to meet the statute’s 28-gram threshold; nothing in the statute requires the
representation to be made at the exact time the methamphetamine changes hands. See I.C.
§ 37-2732B(c).
With respect to the cell-phone conversation that occurred prior to the transaction,
Wilson simply notes “that if the State had merely called Ms. Jones as a witness it could,
presumably, have provided sufficient context by having her testify as to the terms of her
deal with Detective Phillips, including what statements were made during their unrecorded
and unmonitored telephone calls.” (Appellant’s brief, p.20 n.5.) Even if Jones would have
agreed to testify and could have provided additional information about the terms of the
deal, 3 that does not make her testimony necessary for the state to prove the weight element

2

Wilson’s suggestion that Detective Phillips went into the transaction on nothing but an
“assumption that it was the amount he asked for” finds no support in the record.
(Appellant’s brief, p.20.) Detective Phillips explained in his testimony exactly why he
believed he was purchasing one ounce of methamphetamine: Jones agreed to sell him one
ounce of methamphetamine. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.211, L.15 – p.212, L.25.)
3

Jones, of course, had a Fifth Amendment right not to testify on behalf of the state that she
agreed to sell Detective Phillips an ounce of methamphetamine.
12

of the offense. The statute does not dictate how the state must prove that the seller
represented the weight—much less demand that the seller herself testify that she made the
representation. See I.C. § 37-2732B(c).
For this element of the crime, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the methamphetamine sold on April 27 weighed more than 28 grams. The statute expressly
allows the state to prove the weight by showing that the “person selling or delivering” the
methamphetamine represented the weight to be at least 28 grams. I.C. § 37-2732B(c). The
state did so through the testimony of Detective Phillips, the only individual besides Jones
involved in the relevant conversation, who testified that he specifically asked Jones for one
ounce of methamphetamine, and that Jones agreed to provide “it.” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr.,
p.211, L.15 – p.212, L.25.)

His testimony and the circumstances surrounding the

transaction constituted substantial evidence from which the jury could—and did—find that
Jones represented the weight of the methamphetamine to be more than 28 grams.
2. Substantial Evidence Showed Wilson Had The Requisite Intent
The state presented substantial evidence to show that Wilson had the requisite intent
to support the state’s aiding and abetting theory of liability for the April 27 transaction. In
Idaho, the law makes no distinction between a person who directly commits a crime and a
person who intentionally aids and abets its commission. I.C. § 19-1430; see State v.
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 379, 247 P.3d 582, 606 (2010). “To ‘aid and abet’ means to
assist, facilitate, promote, encourage, counsel, solicit, or incite the commission of a crime.”
State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 787, 391 P.3d 1252, 1257 (2017); see I.C. § 19-1430. “To
be an aider and abettor one must share the criminal intent of the principal; there must be a
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community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.” State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380,
386, 716 P.2d 1152, 1158 (1985).
The evidence presented at trial proved that Wilson and Jones acted with “a
community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.” Id. Wilson confessed, on a video
played to the jury, that he “goes with [Jones] when she does deals” to provide “protection.”
(Exhibit 5 at 08:45 – 09:17.) He admitted that, in exchange for his services, Jones provides
Wilson with “lunch” and “dope.” (Id.)
Wilson’s description of his role in the selling of methamphetamine matched his
behavior on April 27. Wilson drove Jones to the meetup location. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr.,
p.214, L.19 – p.215, L.1.) Wilson got out of the car first and “[l]ooked around . . . for a
couple of minutes” before Jones got out of the car. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.7-12.)
After the transaction, Wilson drove Jones away from the scene of the crime. (2/28/2017
Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.20-25.) The jury could readily infer from Wilson’s role in providing
transportation and protection for Jones that he and Jones shared the same intent: to sell
methamphetamine.
But the evidence presented at the trial also showed that Wilson was a much more
significant part of the methamphetamine-selling team than he admitted in the videorecorded interview. It was Wilson—not Jones—who propped up the hood of the car as a
sign to Detective Phillips that they had his methamphetamine ready for sale. (2/28/2017
Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.7-12; see 2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.12-20.) It was Wilson—not
Jones—from whom Officer Peper seized $600 of the duo’s ill-gotten gains. (3/1/2017 Trial
Tr., p.55, Ls.5-12.) And it was Wilson—not Jones—who went to the police station,
claimed that the drug money belonged to him, and told the officers that he obtained the
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money from work and family loans even though the serial numbers matched the money
Detective Phillips used to purchase the methamphetamine from Jones. (3/1/2017 Trial Tr.,
p.68, L.20 – p.76, L.21; p.129, L.11 – p.130, L.4; Exhibits 5-6.) Wilson’s substantial
participation in the sale of the methamphetamine strongly evinces “a community of
purpose” between Wilson and Jones and shows that Wilson “share[d] the criminal intent
of the principal.” Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 386, 716 P.2d at 1158.
Wilson erroneously asserts that the state had to show that he specifically intended
to aid and abet trafficking the exact purported amount of methamphetamine by “prov[ing]
that Mr. Wilson knew the amount of methamphetamine Ms. Jones represented.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.11 (capitalization altered, underlining omitted).) That is inconsistent
with Idaho law. In trafficking cases, “the state is required to prove the amount of the
controlled substance, but not knowledge of the amount.” State v. Barraza-Martinez, 139
Idaho 624, 626, 84 P.3d 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2003). 4 And because the state does not need
to prove knowledge of the amount to convict a principal of trafficking methamphetamine,
the state does not need to prove knowledge of the amount when convicting an aider and
abettor of the same crime. See State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 204, 75 P.3d 1209,
1214 (Ct. App. 2003).

4

Although Barraza-Martinez was a cocaine trafficking case, the court’s analysis and
holding applies equally to methamphetamine trafficking, which is in the same section and
has virtually identical wording. Compare I.C. § 37-2732B(2), with I.C. § 37-2732B(4);
see also State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704, 132 P.3d 455, 461 (Ct. App. 2005) (observing
Barraza-Martinez generally held that “ignorance of the quantity of the substance possessed
. . . is immaterial to a defendant’s culpability for trafficking in a controlled substance”).
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court’s pattern jury instruction for trafficking
methamphetamine requires the state to prove the amount of methamphetamine but not that
the defendant knew the amount. See ICJI 406D; see also State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512,
514, 129 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Ct. App. 2005) (“The pattern Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions
are presumptively correct.”).
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In Romero-Garcia, the state convicted Romero-Garcia of aiding and abetting the
failure to affix illegal drug tax stamps. 139 Idaho at 203, 75 P.3d at 1213. He argued on
appeal that “the jury instructions improperly failed to require the jury to find that RomeroGarcia knew the required tax stamps were not affixed to the cocaine.” 139 Idaho at 203,
75 P.3d at 1213. The Idaho Court of Appeals looked to the mental state required by the
underlying offense to determine whether an aider and abettor must know whether the
stamps were affixed. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho at 204, 75 P.3d at 1214 (“The mental state
required is generally the same as that required for the underlying offense . . . .”). After
reviewing the relevant statutes, the court found that “a person who fails to affix the illegal
drug tax stamps becomes strictly liable for the omission.” Id. Because there was no
knowledge requirement to convict a principal of failing to affix a tax stamp, the court held
the state did not have to prove knowledge to convict an aider and abettor. Id.
Similarly, the mental state required by the underlying offense here does not include
knowledge of the amount of methamphetamine, Barraza-Martinez, 139 Idaho at 626, 84
P.3d at 562, which means it is not an element of aiding and abetting the underlying offense,
see Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho at 204, 75 P.3d at 1214. This, in turn, means the state did
not need to prove that Wilson knew Jones represented the methamphetamine to weigh an
ounce.

Both the jury instructions, to which Wilson did not object, and the

methamphetamine trafficking statute make clear that the relevance of Jones’s
representation was simply to prove the “determinative” amount of the methamphetamine.
I.C. § 37-2732B(c). Specifically, the jury instructions explained that the state could prove
the 28-gram weight element of the crime “Either” (1) by proving the actual “quantity
delivered was at least twenty eight” grams “Or” (2) “the quantity delivered was represented
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to be one ounce or more of methamphetamine.” (Aug. pp.38-39 (underlining in original).)
Thus, the state had to prove that Jones represented the methamphetamine to be at least one
ounce to meet the 28-gram threshold of the trafficking statute but did not have to connect
that representation to Wilson’s knowledge or intent. See Barraza-Martinez, 139 Idaho at
626, 84 P.3d at 562.
Wilson cites Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), to support his
argument (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15), but the holding of that decision does no such thing.
In Rosemond, the Court addressed what intent the government must show when it accuses
a defendant of aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which prohibits using
or carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. 134 S. Ct. at 1243. The question
arose “from the compound nature of that provision,” which requires the prosecutor to prove
a predicate drug-trafficking crime and the use or carrying of a gun during the drug
trafficking crime. Id. at 1245. The Court repeatedly emphasized the dual nature of the
crime charged.

See, e.g., id. at 1245-46, 1248 (referring to the crime at issue as

“compound,” a “two-part incident,” a “combination crime,” and a “double-barreled
crime”). The Court held that “the intent must go to the specific and entire crime charged—
so here, to the full scope (predicate crime plus gun use).” Id. at 1248. Accordingly, rather
than merely have the intent to commit a drug trafficking offense (where a gun happens to
be used), the defendant must have “advance knowledge that a confederate would use or
carry a gun during the crime’s commission.” Id. at 1243.
Unlike the crime at issue in Rosemond, aiding and abetting the trafficking of
methamphetamine is not a “combination crime” because it does not require proof of a
predicate offense. See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 978, 188 P.3d 912, 920 (2008)
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(“[A]iding and abetting is not a separate offense from the substantive crime.”). And
trafficking methamphetamine does not have two parts (e.g., drugs and guns); the full scope
of the crime is simply selling methamphetamine. Thus, even under Rosemond, in order to
prove intent, the state needed to prove only that Wilson knew that Jones was selling
methamphetamine and intentionally assisted in that criminal activity. See, e.g., 134 S. Ct.
at 1249.
Wilson reads Rosemond differently. He cites the U.S. Supreme Court’s language
that the jury must find the “defendant has chosen, with full knowledge, to participate in the
illegal scheme,” id. at 1250, and suggests the state could only prove he had “full
knowledge” here if it proves he had advanced knowledge of the purported amount of the
methamphetamine being sold (Appellant’s brief, p.14). But nothing in Rosemond suggests
that “full knowledge” for the aider and abettor means even more knowledge than required
to convict the principal. Nor could a U.S. Supreme Court decision interpreting federal
statutes overturn the Idaho Court of Appeals’ Romero-Garcia decision or this Court’s
repeated holdings that, under Idaho law, “there are no additional elements the State must
prove” to show accomplice, rather than principal, liability. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 464, 272 P.3d 417, 436 (2012) (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 978, 188 P.3d
912, 920 (2008)). Because the state does not need to prove knowledge of the amount of
methamphetamine being trafficked to convict a principal, Barraza-Martinez, 139 Idaho at
626, 84 P.3d at 562, the “full knowledge” required to convict someone accused of aiding
and abetting the trafficking of methamphetamine cannot possibly include knowledge of the
amount, see Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 464, 272 P.3d at 436.
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The other federal decisions Wilson cites are distinguishable because the
government in those cases charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit drug
trafficking rather than as aiders and abettors. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.). In conspiracy
cases, the criminal act is the making of the agreement, not the actual commission of the
underlying crime. See, e.g., State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 12-13, 333 P.3d 112, 123-24
(2014). And under federal conspiracy law, at least as interpreted by one of the cases Wilson
cites, the government must prove the defendant “could have reasonably foreseen a
distribution conspiracy involving more than” the quantity of the drug required for the
underlying offense. United States v. Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2007). 5
No such requirement exists in Idaho’s aiding and abetting law. Instead, “[t]he mental state
required is generally the same as that required for the underlying offense—the aider and
abettor must share the criminal intent of the principal and there must be community of
purpose in the unlawful undertaking.” Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho at 204, 75 P.3d at 1214.
Here, because the underlying offense does not require that a principal know or intend to

5

Wilson cites two other federal decisions related to conspiracy charges, neither of which
support his argument that “co-conspirators must have knowledge of quantity.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.) In United States v. Hayes, 342 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2003), the
government charged the defendant with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack
cocaine and pointed to two separate drug transactions that each involved approximately 45
grams of crack cocaine. Id. at 386-87. The Fifth Circuit found “the Government’s
circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove that [the defendant] was involved in the
[second] transaction,” which meant it was not part of the charged conspiracy at all and
could not be added toward the 50 grams of crack cocaine required by the statute. Id. at
389-92. The court said nothing about the defendant needing to have knowledge of the
specific amount of crack cocaine used in the transactions. Wilson’s other case is even
further afield. See United States v. Gomez-Rosario, 418 F.3d 90, 104 (1st Cir. 2005)
(holding, without mentioning knowledge required by defendant, that the district court did
not constructively amend the indictment by allowing the jury to determine the drug
quantity, in part, because “[n]o specific drug quantity needs to be proven for a jury to
convict a defendant of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute”).
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traffic the specific amount of methamphetamine purportedly sold, Barraza-Martinez, 139
Idaho at 626, 84 P.3d at 562, the state did not need to prove that Wilson knew the amount
of methamphetamine purportedly sold—either through knowledge of Jones’s
representation or otherwise.
3. Substantial Evidence Showed Wilson Knew Jones Was Selling Methamphetamine
The state presented substantial evidence that Wilson knew the identity of the
substance Jones sold to Detective Phillips. In order to find Wilson guilty on each count of
trafficking methamphetamine, the jury had to find that Wilson knew the substance that
Jones sold on April 7 and April 27 was methamphetamine. (Aug., pp.38-39.) “This
knowledge ‘may be proved by direct evidence or may be inferred from the circumstances.’”
Goggin, 157 Idaho at 7, 333 P.3d at 118 (quoting State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 65,
122 P.3d 321, 324 (Ct. App. 2005)).

A rational trier of fact could infer from the

circumstances surrounding the April 7 and April 27 transactions that Wilson knew Jones
sold Detective Phillips methamphetamine.
The jury could reasonably infer that Wilson knew that Jones was a
methamphetamine dealer. Wilson confessed in his video interview that Jones provides him
with free “dope” in exchange for “protection” for Jones “when she does deals.” (State’s
Exhibit 5 at 08:35 – 09:17.) Although dope can be a generic term that refers to any “illicit,
habit-forming,

or

narcotic

drug,”

Merriam-Webster

Online

Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dope (last visited March 26, 2018), nothing
in the record suggests Jones distributed any illegal substance other than methamphetamine.
In addition, and contrary to Wilson’s assertion (Appellant brief, p.21), “dope” was
identified as methamphetamine during the trial. In the audio recording of the second

20

transaction, Detective Phillips referred to methamphetamine as “dope” when he asked
Jones for an additional ounce. (Exhibit 9 at 01:00 – 1:08; see 2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.216,
Ls.6-11.) Jones knew exactly what Detective Phillips meant: she agreed to provide an
additional ounce but told him she would have to go back to her methamphetamine supplier
and “pick it up and bring it back to [him].” (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.6-13.)
The jury could also reasonably infer that Wilson knew Jones sold
methamphetamine to Detective Phillips based on Wilson’s extensive participation in the
drug sales and his sharing in a significant portion of the proceeds. Wilson rode with Jones
and the methamphetamine to and from the April 7 transaction and drove Jones and the
methamphetamine to and from the April 27 transaction. (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.48; p.190, L.23 – p.191, L.10; p.214, Ls.12-24; p.216, Ls.20-25.) He used the hood of their
vehicle on both occasions to inform Detective Phillips that they had his methamphetamine.
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p. 180, Ls.12-20; p.181, Ls.4-8; p.190, L.23 – p.191, L.3; p.215, Ls.712; p.216, Ls.20-23.) At both transactions, Wilson stood out in front of the car “lingering
around”—presumably providing the confessed “protection” for the drug deal. (2/28/2017
Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.4-8; p.215, Ls.7-12; State’s Exhibit 5 at 08:35 – 09:17.) And Officer
Peper found $600 of the $620 of drug money on Wilson shortly after the second transaction.
(3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.55, Ls.5-12; p.129, L.11 – p.130, L.4.) Given Wilson’s intimate
participation in both sales of the methamphetamine and his reaping 97% of the reward from
the second sale, it strains credulity to suggest he was completely ignorant of the product
being sold.
The amount of money Wilson received also supports the conclusion that Wilson
knew Jones had sold methamphetamine. Wilson confessed in the video played to the jury
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that he had some involvement in the drug trade and that he uses “dope,” which, as explained
above, referred to methamphetamine in the context of the trial. (State’s Exhibit 5 at 08:35
– 09:17; 3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.76, Ls.7-13.) The jury also heard that $600, the amount
found on Wilson, was the “going rate . . . for an ounce of Methamphetamine.” (2/28/2017
Trial Tr., p.177, Ls.4-9.) Although that testimony did not come from Wilson, the jury
could reasonably infer that an admitted participant in the drug trade who also uses
methamphetamine would know the street price for methamphetamine.
Moreover, Wilson’s failed attempt to reclaim the seized money suggests that he
fully understood Jones had sold Detective Phillips methamphetamine. Wilson told the
police that he received the money from work and family loans. (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.70,
L.24 – p.71, L.2; State’s Exhibit 5 at 01:48 – 02:16; State’s Exhibit 6.) But the state put
on evidence showing that the serial numbers on the money seized from Wilson matched
the serial numbers on the money Detective Phillips used to purchase methamphetamine
from Jones. (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.129, L.11 – p.130, L.4.) The jury could reasonably infer
that Wilson misrepresented the source of the funds because he knew Jones sold Detective
Phillips methamphetamine and wanted to avoid facing criminal charges.
In sum, Wilson accompanied a known methamphetamine dealer to two different
clandestine transactions, popped the hood of the car prior to each transaction to inform the
buyer of their presence, lingered around to provide protection while the transactions took
place, closed the hood after each transaction, walked away from the second transaction
with the going-rate for an ounce of methamphetamine in his pocket, and then lied to the
police as to the source of his ill-gotten funds. Given those circumstances, the jury could
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reasonably conclude that Wilson knew the substance being sold in each transaction was
methamphetamine.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Judgment And
Commitment entered upon a jury’s guilty verdict against Wilson on two counts of aiding
and abetting the trafficking of methamphetamine.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2018.
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